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The assessment of Latin American long term economic performance is in urgent need of 
mobilizing more data to match the pressing demands of growth analysts. We present a 
systematic comparison of capital goods imports for 20 Latin American countries in 
1925. It relies on both the foreign trade data of the importing countries and of the major 
exporting countries –the industrialized economies of the time. The quality of foreign 
trade figures i s tested; an homogeneous estimate of capital goods imported is derived, 
and its per capita ranking is discussed providing new light on Latin American 
development levels before import substitution.  
 
Keywords: Latin America, Capital goods, Imports, Investment, Foreign Trade, 
Economic development. 
 
JEL codes: N16, N66, N76.   2
Introduction 
 
The economic historiography of Latin America can offer today a general interpretation 
as to how the economies of the region evolved in the first globalisation era and the 
period following its breakdown, that is, during the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and the first decades of the twentieth century.  Recent studies of these countries, 




However, we still need a precise quantification of the levels of national income or GDP 
which covers all the countries in the region and includes their levels of capital 
formation, which, as is well known, is a key determinant of long-term economic growth, 
as well as a fundamental component of national expenditure.  The most comprehensive 
quantitative reconstruction of GDP is the one recently published by Maddison which 
estimates the GDP of 13 Latin American countries since 1920.  Little is known of the 
situation of the excluded countries for this time.
3  
 
Knowledge of the evolution of capital formation during the 1920s is much scarcer 
despite the magnificent work carried out by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) in its first phase.  The celebrated Economic Study of Latin America 
1949 introduced a way of evaluating the historical national accounts by focusing on 
expenditure.
4 A lively interest in discovering how the process of capitalisation 
developed ?  to which can be attributed a decisive importance in the limited economic 
performance of the region  ?  moved the author of the study (Raúl Prebisch) to give a 
central position to capital formation in the statistical structure of his work.  The study   3
was limited to four big economies -Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico- from 1925 to 
1949.  The ECLA took it up in its series of studies of the economic development of the 
area which also tended to take the year 1925 as its starting point.
5 Unfortunately the 
ECLA did not accomplish the analysis of every country, which may explain why these 
studies were not awarded the status of official figures.
6 This meant that a complete 
picture of total investment in Latin American countries was not available until after the 
Second World War.  One can certainly say that after the programme of retrospective 
statistics carried out by the ECLA in its early years, there had been no other attempt 
comparable, in its intention to include as many Latin American countries as possible, to 
the one by Hofman, who has produced, with great rigour, a continuous series of gross 
fixed capital formation from 1900 to 1994 for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela.
7 One must agree with the author that the above countries 
contribute the lion's share of the Latin American economy, purely on the grounds of 
regional GDP.  But it is also undeniable that the populations of the remaining 14 
countries should not be ignored, to say nothing of the Caribbean countries which won 
political sovereignty at a later date.   
 
The aim of the present article is to make known the first results of a research project 
which aspires to compile indices of the gross capital formation of 20 Latin American 
republics based on their imports of intermediate and capital goods. It is an approach 
which has been explored by several authors since the pioneering work on Brazil by 
Fishlow.
8 Although this author's findings revealed the enormous potential knowledge 
locked in foreign trade statistics no attempt has been made, until now, to undertake a 
systematic exploration of them which goes beyond the analysis of a handful of specific 
economies in certain circumstances.
9 The great added value of the research we are   4
starting lies, without doubt, in the utilisation of trade statistics from a ll the Latin 
American countries and those of their main trading partners: the Germany, UK, US 
(G3), France and Belgium (G5, together with the first three).
10  The empirical evidence 
offered here, in advance of the results, refers to the year 1925, complemented by 
information from 1924. It includes the imports of iron and steel goods and all types of 
electrical goods. These products have been chosen for their importance in investment 
expenditure. The timeframe of this study was chosen for three reasons.  The first is, as 
we have mentioned, 1925 became the chronological departure point of the ECLA’s 
study of the economic dynamics of the region.  The second reason for fixing the lens of 
analysis on this year is that, with all probability, it is representative of the world 
economy’s normal operation after the First World War, with reconstruction complete 
and monetary and financial stability in place.  Lastly, 1925 provides us with foreign 
trade statistics of sufficient quality for almost all the countries under study, unlike the 
period before the First World War.  Before this date deficiencies in information were 






Metal and electrical products constitute a fundamental component of capital goods.  
From the beginning of industrialisation to, at least, the mature stages of the second 
Industrial Revolution, machinery and other capital assets, tools, structural elements of 
buildings and engineering works, means of transport and in effect a large portion of 
capital goods, were all constructed with metal, especially iron and steel.  A calculation   5
of the quantities used provides us with the essence of capital formation.  It is also true 
that in the past a considerable portion of the final products destined for consumption 
were also  made of these same metals.  One only has to think of the wide range of 
domestic products from kitchen utensils to electrical devices through to family cars.  A 
very practical reason prevents us from identifying the demand of investment due to 
consumption;  the foreign trade figures of the time do not differentiate sufficiently 
between finished products destined for productive ends and those for the consumer.
11  
In the case of metal production goods (numerous types of semi finished goods) it is, in 
general, simply impossible to establish such a distinction.  This is even truer of 
electrical goods (equipment, material, devices).  But, in overall terms, and with 
reference to the historic period under study, it may be given as understood that most of 
the metals were used to cater for the demands of investment.  Numerous authors  ?  
almost all the scholars of historical national accounting  ?  have estimated gross fixed 
capital formation based on the total quantity of metals consumed.  
 
The quantitative reconstruction which we are making known here includes all the iron 
and steel goods imported by Latin American countries as well as all types of electrical 
material (from electrical machinery to the simplest electrical material).  Most of the 
non-ferrous metal products are not included in this quantitative assessment.
12 It is 
interesting to note that iron and steel represents the vast majority of manufactured 
metals consumed in the region.  According to figures for the value of imports only 5.8 
per cent of the metals purchased abroad in 1925 were not iron or steel.
13 
 
Our work of empirical reconstruction starts with the assumption that goods of this type, 
so necessary for the productive investment of Latin America, were supplied basically by   6
a small number of industrialised countries.  In more general terms this situation is 
already known and recognised in the historiography.
14 For this reason it is now essential 
to precisely establish what proportion of iron and steel products imported by the Latin 
American nations came from the G5 countries.  Table 1 was compiled with the intention 
of answering this question.  It must be noted that it was put together using the 
commercial figures from the Latin American republics that we have and which fulfil the 
minimum requirements for this comparative exercise.
15 
 
< Table 1 here  > 
 
The data in the table leaves little room for doubt or any diversity of opinion.  The pre-
dominance of the G5 countries was immense and almost unvarying, in general terms 
between 1913 and 1925.  Practically all metal goods imported by Latin America came 
from the countries which we have grouped as G5. The relative decline of France and 
Belgium was to a certain degree compensated by the G3 countries ?  where we can see a 
similar decline in exports from UK and Germany and a compensatory increase in 
exports from the US ?  so that the G5 countries hardly lost any ground in their absolute 
dominion of the Latin American market.  Only for Bolivia and presumably Paraguay do 
we have to raise any doubt as to the use of data from  the industrialised nations to 
establish the goods brought by the 20 countries under study.
16 What is more, leaving to 
one side these two small economies whose atypical line of commercial relations is due 
to the land-locked character of their territories
17, it is justifiable to limit the scope of the 
investigation, in 1925, to the exports from the G3 countries. We can see that these sales 
of the G3 countries comprise nothing less than 85 per cent of the total.  Any inference   7
drawn from this empiric base on imports of this type as a whole is, without doubt, very 
solid.  
 
Can the same be said with regards to machinery?  It is interesting to clarify the degree to 
which the purchase of machinery from abroad on the part of the Latin American nations 
depends on the G3 countries, given that investment is more closely associated with this 
class of products than the group of metal goods (which also comprises of, as we have 
said, semi manufactured and finished products destined for consumption).  Table 2 
offers clear and predictable results.  The relative importance of the US, Germany and 
Britain is even greater, close to 90 per cent and the variation is less (only in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Brazil is the percentage lower than 90 per cent). 
 








A point of crucial importance is the degree of reliability the foreign trade statistics of 
the exporting and importing countries deserve.  This is a question which has been dealt 
with from a theoretical and empirical point of view in previous economic literature, but 
studies are not exactly abundant, and almost all of them have concentrated on the total 
value of imports and exports.
18 There is some doubt that whatever may be deduced from   8
a comparison at this aggregate level may also be applicable to the capital goods group.  
For this reason it is necessary to perform a comparison of the statistics referring to iron, 
steel and electrical products. 
 
When carrying out an exercise of this nature we are faced with two complications.  The 
first is more of a limitation; it is not possible to make a direct comparison, in general 
terms, of the amounts because some countries do not express all the items with the same 
unit of measurement.  It is interesting to clarify that in a great number of cases the 
traded products are recorded according to their weight. Some countries, and only in a 
reduced number of tariff headings, account in units which are not automatically 
convertible into units of weight.
19 Thus it would be possible to compare physical 
magnitudes only if certain countries were to be omitted or if a certain number of 
products were to be isolated.  The former would impose a serious restriction on a study 
which hoped to include the entire region, while the latter would in practice become an 
overly arduous task.  This brings us to the second complication which will be outlined 
below. 
 
Conventionally, the extremely wide class of iron and steel products is classified into 
three large groups; metal groups (finished and semi finished), machinery and 
transportation material. This classification is conceptually clear and makes sense 
analytically. The largest part of investment is obtained from the estimation of machinery 
and transport equipment, although we must not lose sight of the fact that a fraction is 
included in metal goods (such as the metal structures of production facilities, tools and 
other means of production not included in machinery). What is more, electrical 
equipment and material ?  which sources often separate from metal products ?  become   9
an element of investment which grows in importance with the spread of electrification.  
In recognition of this importance a fourth group is usually added to the first three, one 
which includes electrical material and electrical machinery. 
 
We have followed this scheme, classifying products in four large categories: iron and 
steel products not including machinery and means of transport, machinery of all types 
(including parts and accessories), means of transport (excluding fixed material such as 
rails, sleepers, etc, which are accounted for in the first category), and lastly, electrical 
material and devices.  Nevertheless the statistics for foreign trade of the Latin American 
countries and their main partners do not allow the classification of tariff headings.  
Quite often the description of the nature of the articles which the tariff structure offers 
gives rise to uncertainties over their assignation to one category or the other. Sometimes 
the goods under one heading belong in two categories.  Such methodological problems 
imply a problem of greater importance; the difficulty of maintaining the same criteria of 
classification for all the 25 countries under examination.  Strictly speaking, the figures 
from all the countries are not exactly comparable in any of the categories used. We have 
been guided by the criterion of finding a common denominator in the statistics for the 
G3 countries that follows as closely as possible the classification that we have just 
described.
20 In the case of the Latin American nations, it would be impossible for the 
reader of these pages to form an idea of the complexity of the cataloguing of metal 
goods.  From this it follows that the only really reliable comparison between the figures 
of the different countries available to us is one which refers to the maximum possible 
degree of aggregation: the imports (exports) of all the iron, steel and electrical goods.  
This does not mean that the comparative analysis of the quantity of machinery, vehicles 
or any other category should be abandoned.  What happens is that, in this case, one must   10
remember that the figures for some countries are somewhat overvalued or undervalued 
in respect to the others, since they cover a wider or narrower range of products.  Here 
we have shied away from those stormy seas to avoid unduly heavy methodological 
analysis.  Table 3 contains the results of comparisons made at the most aggregated 
level. 
 
< Table 3 here> 
 
The first thing that comes to our attention when looking at this table is that the total 
value of exports from the G3 countries virtually coincides with that of the imports of the 
receiving countries. A difference of only 0.8 per cent between both magnitudes cannot 
but surprise because it entails a virtual and unusual equivalence between thousands of 
pairs of transactions.  It must be emphasised that this could be due to chance, given that 
a similar relation cannot be seen between the exports of each of the G3 countries and the 
imports from Latin America. The entire figure for the US exceeds by 2 per cent that 
registered by its customers, while in the case of Germany the opposite can be seen to a 
slightly larger degree (3.1 per cent), and in the case of UK by quite a larger margin (8.2 
per cent). Did the Latin American countries erroneously record products produced in the 
US as originating from Germany and Britain? Or, on the other hand, were products 
manufactured in Germany and Britain attributed to the US after coming from American 
ports on their journey to Latin America? It is not possible to answer these questions 
using the foreign t rade statistics themselves, but if we focus on the description and 
analysis of their characteristics carried out at the time by the League of Nations it is 
possible that, in general terms, there are more chances of the first being true than the 
second.
21 But there exist other possible causes to explain the discrepancies mentioned.    11
It can be affirmed, with certainty, that the British figures, in their entirety, are somewhat 
below the real figures, because in this country's statistics only the totals feature of all the 
products exported to each Latin American republic in the categories of ‘machinery’ and 
‘iron and steel and manufactures thereof’. They record only a part, albeit the biggest, of 
the transport equipment and electrical material exported to the majority of these 
countries.
22  With regards to Germany, the official figures shown in Table 3 are also 
slightly below the real ones because minor transactions were not entered individually 
under the corresponding statistical headings, but in the category of ‘other merchandise’ 
(waren, anderweit nicht genannt).
23  
 
With this in mind, is it acceptable that the total value of the trade of these goods 
declared by the exporters be practically identical to that declared by the importers?  It is 
legitimate for the reader to pose this question.  But this is not the correct way to test the 
quality of foreign trade statistics.  It is more appropriate to compare the figures of each 
of the importers with their commercial partners, since amongst the importers there exist 
notable differences in the method of evaluation of the products they buy from abroad.
24 
We will review the last column (Col.12) of the Table 3.  
 
Only in cases in which the importing countries evaluated the imported merchandise 
according to its free on board (f.o.b.) value can we expect the export figures, according 
to our calculations, to be equivalent, or almost equivalent, to those we have calculated 
on the import side.  We judge this to be the case for Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic, in that the differences are of 1 or 2 per cent (see col. 12).  We take 
it as understood that no importance is to be attached to such a minor discrepancy, since 
it could be simply due to the merchandise being temporarily held in customs   12
warehouses.
25 As for the  Latin American states which dealt in cost, insurance and 
freight (c.i.f.) values, it can be expected that the value of imports will supersede that of 
exports by a percentage situated at a minimum of 6 or 7 per cent for the Central 
American countries whose  purchases are more concentrated with their powerful 
northern neighbour, and a maximum of around 12 per cent for the countries of the 
southern cone which are supplied, in the main, by Europe.  If we start with this premise 
the figures corresponding to Brazil and Costa Rica tally.  In respect to Ecuador, a 
certain doubt may be entertained given that, still following the c.i.f. system of valuation, 
it seems that in an unknown number of cases freight and insurance were discounted.
26  
And what will occur with the rest of the countries in order for us to make comparisons? 
Let's look at the discrepancies in the same order as they appear in Table 3.  The 
correspondence that can be seen in the case of Argentina, and the same goes for 
Colombia, is not real, only apparent.  Both countries use the c.i.f. system of valuation 
which means that the figures registered for imports are too low.  The Argentinean 
disparity is easy to explain.  As the Argentinean authorities themselves acknowledged, 
the values assigned to imports w ere based on official values of obsolete units that 
haven't been sufficiently adjusted for the inflation of the First World War.
27 Statistics in 
Guatemala were also affected by this same problem, possibly even more acutely than in 
Argentina, since the Argentineans were probably more interested in knowing with a 
greater degree of accuracy the value of purchases from abroad than in Guatemala.  The 
huge difference recorded in Bolivia is due, with all certainty, to the industrialised 
nations not registering the Andean country as a destination for all the products produced 
and exported by them but which in fact did end up there after a long and costly journey 
by land.  We may conjecture that the opposite happened in other places, namely; 
Colombia, Haiti, Mexico and also Peru.  It appears that in these four countries the trade   13
statistics themselves undervalued imports by an order of magnitude of around 10 per 
cent.
28 Finally there remains to explain the most spectacular discrepancy, that of El 
Salvador.  Discounting  the differential between the c.i.f. values (the El-Salvadorian 
accounts) and the f.o.b. values (the G3 country accounts), the El-Salvadorian figures are 
still 30 per cent higher than those registered by their suppliers.  We haven't been able to 
find any reason to account for this discrepancy other than the faulty elaboration of 
statistics on the part of the El-Salvadorian authorities.
29 
 
Let us sum up.  The values of the G3 countries are shown to be very consistent when 
compared with those of the Latin American countries.  Only in the case of Bolivia does 
it seem clear that the G3 statistics undervalued the quantity of exports.  Everything 
points to the same thing having happened in Paraguay
30, but with no other country in 
the region.  On the other hand, there is nothing which allows us to suspect that the data 
from the G3 countries exaggerates the magnitude of exports to certain countries, except 
Panama. Due to the exceptional circumstances in Panama owing to transportation by the 
canal and the existence of adjacent territory under North American control, it is feared 
that the official value of exports from the US to Panama far exceeds the value of what 
the Panamanian economy really imported (outside the canal zone).  Lastly, the fact that 
exports and imports are practically the same in a significant number of cases (7 Latin 
American countries out of a total of 15 compared) supports the notion that the figures 
from the G3 countries are reliable.  This, we repeat, is only seen not to be true in respect 
to the three small countries we have just mentioned, with their unusual circumstances.   
 
 
   14
III 
 
The conclusions drawn from the exercise of comparison described in the previous 
section lead on to calculating the magnitude of total imports of capital goods by Latin 
American countries, based on the foreign trade statistics of the G3 countries.  Given the 
proven consistency of these figures and the prime importance of the G3 countries in the 
supply of the said class of goods to all the countries in the region, there can be few 
doubts as to the soundness of the estimates. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of our calculations ?  a homogeneous estimate of capital 
goods imported by Latin American countries.  For all of them, except when the contrary 
is noted (see table notes), the figures are derived directly by multiplying the value of 
exports from the G3 countries (col. 10, table 3) by the inverse of the value (in percent) 
corresponding to the importance of the imports from the G3 countries in the total 
imports (see table1).  That is to say, the figures in table 4 result from a direct 
extrapolation of the magnitude of the G3 exports, according to our calculations, but 
corrected by their importance on total imports. 
 
On scanning this table some aspects immediately spring to our attention.  One of them 
is the extremely diverse importance of the economies of the region.  Argentina stands 
out as taking up a third of the purchases in the whole region.  It is followed by Brazil, 
quite a distance behind, which absorbs a fifth of the total and then Mexico and Cuba, 
each with slightly more than 10 per cent of the total.  Almost three quarters of the 
imports of capital goods are concentrated in these four countries.  Far behind them is a 
group of five economies, whose imports represent between three and six per cent of the   15
total: Chile (5.9), Colombia (4.4), Venezuela (3.5), Peru (3.3) and Uruguay (2.9).  The 
imports of the 11 remaining nations do not reach the significance of 1 per cent of the 
total, or to put it another way, at the most they represent only 1/36th of Argentinean 
imports. 
 
< Table 4 here> 
 
Obviously these enormous disparities are related to the very different territorial and 
demographic sizes of the Latin American nations as is shown in table 4. While the 
population of some countries does not reach half a million inhabitants, others have more 
than 10 million and there is even one giant (Brazil) with 30 million people.  If we study 
the imports per capita (col. 3) the results take on a different perspective.  But the 
dispersion of positions continues to be very high.  Between the first country (Argentina) 
and the last (Haiti) the ratio of imports to inhabitants is more than 18:1. If we establish 
the comparison between the second (Cuba) and the second last (Ecuador) the ratio is 
still more than 10:1. As is obvious in graph 1, the order is perfectly delimited.  It is 
headed by Argentina and Cuba.  Uruguay occupies third place, further from the two 
richest countries than the fourth, Chile.  Next, and still above the regional average, are, 
almost neck and neck, Panama and Venezuela.  The levels of imports for the remaining 
14 nations are below the regional average.  Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic are 
about 20 per cent under the average, while Mexico reaches exactly 2/3.  Close behind 
and all virtually on the same level, are the other large economies of the region; 
Colombia, Brazil and Peru.  On the smooth downward slope which carries on from this 
point, at 50 per cent of the regional average, are most of the small Central American 
economies; Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.  At the end, stretching   16
from a level of 40 per cent of the average down to a woeful 15 per cent are Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Haiti. 
 
< Graph 1 here > 
 
The table and graph mentioned reveal some surprising facts and are full of extremely 
interesting information.  That Cuba rivals for first place and almost equals Argentina is, 
without doubt, a fact that stands out and which has not been sufficiently highlighted in 
the historiography.
31 It is also of special interest that almost all the other large sized 
economies do not reach the Latin American average.  On the other hand, the identities 
of the exceptions to this tendency  ?  Chile and the emergent Venezuela  ?  would 
probably come as no surprise to  anyone familiar with the economic history of the 
subcontinent. By the same token, the excellent position of Uruguay is acceptable.  
Without detracting any value from the empirical evidence we are presenting, there is 
neither any surprise in the lagging behind of the bulk of the small Central American 
countries, as well as in the fact that the bottom places are taken by the two land-locked 
countries and Haiti. What could be surprising is that Ecuador appears in this last group, 
and that amongst the countries that developed relatively well are the Dominican 
Republic and, slightly more predictably, Costa Rica.
32 Apart from this, Panama, an 
unknown quantity until now, has at last found its place in the Latin American puzzle, 
and is much more prominent than economic historians had previously thought.  Here is 
to be found precisely the principal value of this quantitative exercise: it draws an overall 
map of the Latin American economy in the middle of the 1920s which identifies in a 
precise manner the relative position occupied by each and every one of its components. 
   17
Is it valid to draw conclusions about capital formation from the above picture?  The 
evidence that has been forwarded above is a reasonable approximation, but could be 
easily improved by limiting the quantitative elaboration of the compiled data to the 
tariff headings referring to machinery.  The new aggregation provides an excellent 
indicator of the current investment made by the American republics (see table 5).  It is 
worth pointing out that the products included did not manage to represent, in 1925, 30 
per cent of metal and electrical goods.
33 The distribution by country is essentially the 
same as that relative to the whole of these goods, although we can observe some 
differences not wholly devoid of interest.  Argentina and Brazil take up slightly less 
than half of the machinery imports owing to the share of the former being no more than 
26.8 per cent (it must be remembered that the figure for total capital goods reached 33), 
a difference not compensated by the larger importance of the colossus of the 
subcontinent which just reached a quota of 22 per cent.  Mexico and Cuba, like Brazil, 
now have a slightly larger share.  The top four economies take up almost three quarters 
of the means of production imported by Latin America, as happened with all the capital 
goods.  Chile, Venezuela and Peru all have a higher quota, whilst Colombia and 
Uruguay have less.  The remaining economies have as minor a share of the acquisition 
of machinery as they do of the wider range of products analysed. 
 
Matching the imports with population (right-hand column of table 5) gives a very 
different picture from the previous one ?  which will not be wondered at after having 
taken into account the differing sizes of the countries and also their very unequal stages 
of development.  What should claim our attention immediately are the similarities and 
differences between the equivalent series of numbers in the preceding table.  Graph 2   18
facilitates such a comparison by pairing the relative level of each country in both types 
of goods. 
 
< Graph 2 here > 
 
The graph illustrates a wealth of changes in the relative positions.  In fact, only the two 
last countries maintain their positions; Ecuador and Haiti respectively in second last and 
last position (Haiti even more so than before).  At the top, Argentina and Cuba swap 
places, as do Uruguay and Chile.  The Caribbean island not only overtakes Argentina, 
but does so comfortably.  Venezuela goes up to a level clearly above the regional 
average, while Panama slips several positions to well below.  The other big economies 
suffer a different fate; Mexico, Peru, and to a lesser degree Brazil, climb, although they 
are still far off the regional average.  Colombia, on the other hand, falls.  Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic are displaced by the thrust of these big economies.  The other 
Central American economies, with the exception of Nicaragua, are positioned at the end 
group with their very low volume of machinery purchases.  Surprisingly, Bolivia and 
Paraguay go up by simply maintaining their modest relative levels of imports. 
 
Up to now the empirical evidence presented has referred, as we have indicated, to only 
one year, 1925.  The relative national levels of machinery and other capital goods 
purchasing which we have established rest on this slim chronological base, as well as 
the conjectures and interpretations we have developed from the statistical material.  It is 
always risky to draw major conclusions from a time period limited to one year.  It is 
even more so when analysing investments, which are of a very volatile character, 
especially in developing economies.  The risk is certainly mitigated when long-term or   19
structural factors are involved, such as the levels of economic or industrial development, 
which are only partially affected by temporary factors.  But to what proportion do the 
figures in tables 5 and 6 vary if they refer to a wider time period? It is possible, and 
even probable, that the relative positions of the countries will be significantly altered if 
the analysis includes another year.  With the intention of dispelling these doubts, the 
empirical base has been extended to the previous year, 1924. Table 6 compares the 
results from both years. 
 
< Table 6 here > 
 
In general the changes are not dramatic, but they are substantial for more than half of 
the countries.  They are hardly, or not at all, relevant for Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay or Peru.  But the relative position of seven 
economies notably improves when one takes into account the average of 1924 and 
1925, owing to, it seems the second year being characterised by a greater reduction in 
investment.  An extreme case is that of the Dominican Republic where the average 
supersedes by 27.4 per cent the 1925 level.  Also very notable are the upward 
corrections of Ecuador (19.7) and Honduras (17.8) and the lower, although still 
significant, corrections of Panama (14.1), El Salvador (13.1), Cuba (8.8) and Bolivia 
(8.5).  On the other hand, regarding the average of the two years, the position got worse 
in Venezuela (16.1), Haiti (15.9), Uruguay (9.5), Brazil (7.3) and Colombia (6.4).  
Summing up, it is undeniable that in order to obtain a more reliable picture of the 
magnitudes of importation of capital goods and investment reached by the Latin 
American republics in the middle of the 1920s, one must look at the data for 1924-5, 
rather than only the last of these two years.   20
 
Further evidence of the unbiased character of 1925 benchmark could be found  in 
Hofman’s gross total fixed investment series.
34  For Argentina, and following him, 1925 
is a normal year in the middle of the 1920s upward investment trend. The absolute value 
of 1925 is very similar to 1924 and 1926. The recent Alan Taylor’s figures confirm that 
nothing exceptional happens around 1925.
35 Both Venezuela and Colombia have a 
growing trend during the decade, and 1925 was, just as for Argentina, a normal year. 
Chile has a more fluctuating pattern with a less clear trend, but even so, 1925 is an 
average year.  For Brazil, on the contrary, 1925 is a booming year, only second to 1929.  
Mexico’s situation is similar to Brazil, with 1925 as the best year of the 1920s.   So, 
according to Hofman’s estimates, we should we aware of the risk of overassessing 






Having arrived at this point, the reader will have been assailed by at least two doubts of 
fundamental importance: to what degree can we relate the relative level of machinery 
imports to capital formation?  And: are the relative levels observed in 1925 
representative of the volume of investment reached in the middle of the 1920s in the 
different countries under study (in relation to the regional average)? In the rest of this 
section we will try to give a tentative and provisional answer to these questions by 
making use of the information we have collected up to now. 
   21
The first question inevitably arises from certain indicators and evaluations offered by 
economic historiography as to the progress achieved before the Great Depression by 
some Latin American countries in the process of industrialisation.  From the beginning, 
it has to be pointed out that economic historians are still not yet able to trace a global 
picture of the state of Latin American industrial development between the wars.  
Economic historiography has managed to clear up this question in a minimal fashion for 
a few specific countries, but it is very far from being able to offer a panoramic and 
comprehensive view of the whole region.  Do accessible primary sources exist that 
could help in this? As far as we know, there exist two collections of surveys and 
research which could help, carried out several years later by public institutions not 
related to the states of the regions; the studies by the ECLA, which we have referred to 
before, and the official reports written by the Tariff Commission of the U.S. Congress 
during the Second World War.  For our interests the second collection of studies is more 
useful since it covers the evolution and situation of the mining and industrial sectors of 
every single Latin American nation.
36 The main inconvenience of these analyses is that 
they were elaborated almost two decades after the period studied here and they are 
centred on gathering information about economic evolution in the 1930s, and especially, 
about the situation during the war years.  But, when studied more closely, this is not an 
absolute limitation, since when one of these reports states the inexistence of certain 
productive activities in a country we can take it for granted that the situation was the 
same in 1925.  We cannot consider that there existed in this period deeply rooted 
industrial activity that disappeared or fell into decline during the 1930s and the Second 
World War.  What tended to occur was the exact opposite; the international crisis was 
an opportunity for growth in Latin American industry.  So we can be assured that what 
did not exist in 1945 had not been present two decades before.   22
 
In 1945 numerous economies in the region were still importing practically all the 












46, the Dominican Republic
47 and 
Venezuela
48.  At the end of the Second World War in all these countries the 
metalworking establishments consisted of small foundries, vehicle and machinery repair 
shops and, in the case of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay  and Venezuela, small 
mechanical industries dedicated to the manufacture of simple tools and utensils and 
some machinery components.  In Colombia the metallurgical industry grew out of the 
international crisis of 1929
49, as in Peru which, following Brazil, resorted to prohibiting 
the importation of certain types of machinery, but without breaking its traditional 
dependency on abroad for almost all semi finished and finished iron and steel goods.
50 
In Cuba, since the protectionist tariff of 1927, a metalworking industry was developed 
with the capacity to manufacture diverse tools and even some light machinery as well as 
spare parts.
51 Uruguay's early adoption of an industrialisation policy did not save it ?  
for several decades  ?  from continuing to buy most of the machinery used by its 
industry from abroad, although it did manage to produce for itself hardware items, 
domestic equipment and utensils, vehicle bodywork and agricultural tools and 
equipment.
52 In reality the only countries in 1925 that had anything like a developed 
metallurgical industry were Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico. 
 
The ECLA studies would confirm, point by point, the picture traced a few years before 
by the North American analysts.  Even for a period as late as the 1950s this institution 
opted to estimate investment in capital goods based on the imports of these goods for   23
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic.  Even in Colombia and Peru machinery and capital equipment imports still 
satisfied practically all apparent consumption.
53  
 
Some studies of the most industrially advanced economies by economic historians have 
suggested that during the period after the First World War the national metallurgical 
industries acquired considerable importance.  That is, in Brazil in 1919 imports only 
covered 64 per cent of apparent consumption of metal products and 53.5 per cent of 
transport equipment, although reaching 96.7 per cent of mechanical capital goods and 
100 per cent of electrical.
54 Regarding Argentina  in the years 1925 to 1929, Díaz 
Alejandro calculates that 65 per cent of internal demand for metal was satisfied by 
imports, 79 per cent of machinery, vehicles and non-electrical equipment and 98 per 
cent of the demand for electrical machinery and artefacts.
55 This fragmented statistical 
information encourages an overly optimistic idea of the capacity of these more 
industrially advanced countries in 1925 for supplying themselves with the machinery 
they needed.  The percentages for both countries appear to be excessively high in the 
light of the retrospective estimates made by the ECLA.  The data for Brazil, just after 
the world war, is surely heavily influenced by the disruptions caused by the conflict.  
This would explain why at such a late date as 1949 the imports for transport material 
covered 60 per cent of internal demand, which is seven percentage points more than in 
1919.
56 In the case of Argentina it is also noteworthy that from 1937 to 1939, after some 
years of accelerated substitution of imports, purchases from abroad of machinery and 
capital equipment still satisfied 77 per cent of apparent consumption.
57    
   24
Our own data shows the existence of a basic metal transformation industry in many 
countries, through the exports of iron and steel ingots by the  G5 countries.  But 
precisely this information gives a good measure of the very modest dimensions of this 
sector.  The information is eloquent: the whole of Latin America received 19.508 metric 
tons of foundry products, whose value was equivalent to only 0.23 per cent of imports 
of iron and steel finished goods and 0.1 per cent of the total of ferrous metal products.  
In no country were these acquisitions of primary metalworking products of any 
relevance.
58  It is true that one must take into account that in certain places in Latin 
America there already existed a modern iron and steel industry.  But their production 
levels were still very low, even in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which had 
abundant reserves of iron ore. Indeed, according to ECLA iron and steel production 
started later than 1925 for all these three countries and for Colombia and Cuba.
59 Only 
in Mexico can this capacity not be ignored.  Iron and steel production was situated at 
61,3 thousand metric tons. Iron and steel imports amounted to 104,6 thousand metric 
tons
60.  Our best estimate of total iron and steel goods imported suggests a minimum of 
250 thousand metric tons.
61  If all the domestic iron and steel production was to be 
transformed into the standard iron and steel imported good, we could estimate the 
degree of import substitution in Mexico as very close to 20 per cent. This ratio is likely 
to be a maximum as the assumptions made are over optimistic.  
 
In short, from this scarce statistical information and the expert evaluations it can be 
deduced that in the middle of the 1920s Latin America covered the demand for capital 
equipment by importation.  With the exceptions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
perhaps Uruguay, it would not be risking much to suppose that imports and apparent 
consumption were virtually the same.  In the countries we have just mentioned it could   25
not be argued that this was exactly the case for iron and steel working nor even for non-
electrical machinery, but everything points to all the electrical machinery which they 
equipped themselves with, as well as electrical articles and material, being imported. 
 
So, after examining the primary and secondary literature on the subject there is a 
possible doubt as to the existence of a domestic industry producing machinery and 
capital equipment in a few countries, although it would be safe to say that in most cases 
it only covered a small part of internal demand.  If this is the case, the interpretations 
based on imports (table 5) undervalue the magnitudes of investment in these countries 
by moderately reducing their levels in respect to the other countries that were supplied 
exclusively from abroad.  So now it is necessary to use the data for the importation of 
capital goods estimated from the sales figures of the G3 countries to dispel any doubts. 
Looking at them carefully, it is possible to test the hypothesis of the existence of a 
home-grown metalworking and mechanical industry.  One only has to start with the 
simple supposition that in its first stages of development this industry needed to import 
a larger amount of machinery (as well as prime materials and other inputs) than the 
economy was able to produce for itself and which were vital for the working and 
expansion of this new industry.  The subsequent historical experience of the Latin 
American economies themselves has corroborated the universal validity of this 
phenomenon, as the ECLA has indicated on innumerable occasions.
62 Let us suppose 
that one of the countries under study produced a minimally significant quantity of metal 
goods, transport materials or even a certain number of simple machines.  In this case the 
structure of its capital goods imports would be different from a country that did not 
produce these articles.  The purchases of machinery and electrical equipment would 
have had more relative importance in the first country than the second, and also the   26
purchase of finished iron and steel goods and means of transport would have been lower 
in the first.  Table 7 allows us to check this hypothesis. 
 
< Table 7 here > 
 
In the table there is no sign of the aforementioned structural changes.  In one or two 
countries a slight trace of one may be glimpsed, but it is either not very clear or it 
contradicts the level of industrial development reached according to the knowledge 
provided by historiography.  Cuba and Peru at first sight seem to support the hypothesis: 
they import relatively more machinery and fewer finished articles and means of 
transport (taking as a reference the relative position of the total iron and steel goods 
imported).  Cuba also imports more electrical material than one would expect, while the 
opposite is the case for Peru (a circumstance which could be explained by its generally 
slow economic development).  But such a deduction finds no support in the literature.
63 
If we concentrate our attention on the countries where it is reasonable to expect the 
existence of a mechanical industry, contradictory situations of varying degrees are 
discovered which reduce the value of the evidence supporting the hypothetical situation.  
For example, in Brazil machinery imports are relatively high whilst imports of finished 
goods are below normal.  But the high level of means of transport imports seems to 
negate the existence of a domestic metallurgical sector.  The same thing occurs in Chile, 
with the difference that the relative excess of imports corresponds to finished goods.  
Mexico follows the same pattern as Brazil.  As for Argentina and Uruguay, the table 
shows no indication whatsoever of any national metallurgical industry. 
 




As we said at the beginning, there are as yet no estimates of the GDP and capital 
formation of all the Latin American countries in 1925 available.  One has to go forward 
two decades to get a more complete macro economic picture.  Since it is so convenient 
to compare the quantitative work presented in these pages with other estimates it seems 
opportune to do so at the end of this paper, although it will be of only a portion of the 
Latin American nations. 
 
The recent reconstructions of GDP per capita carried out by Maddison and Oxlad are of 
great range temporally and territorially  ?  they provide data for 13 and 11 countries 
respectively for 1925  ?  which gives us plenty of scope for comparison with our 
figures.
64  It is even possible to include another country of great interest, Cuba, thanks 
to the quantification exercise performed by Bulmer-Thomas for 1928, if one accepts the 
inconvenience of establishing comparisons with information from this year.
65  
Unfortunately the empirical base is much narrower in the field of capital formation: the 
like magnitudes are reduced to six big economies.
66 Table 8 contains all the values in 
question, together with those presented in tables 4 and 5, previous to transformation of 
all of them in a manner which provides direct and easy comparison.
67  
 
<Table 8 here> 
 
The table makes for quite disconcerting reading.  A priori one would have expected a 
greater similarity between the two last columns than between the first ones (between, on   28
one hand, columns 1, 3, 5 and 6, and on the other, columns 2, 4 and 7).  In these one 
would not look for anything more than a rough similarity in orders of magnitude, given 
that for a certain level of income per capita it is perfectly possible for there to be fairly 
unequal values of investment, that is of capital goods imports per capita ?  perhaps even 
of 1:2? But, all in all, the similarities do not predominate and what's more, they are 
relatively more numerous in the left-hand part of the table. 
 
Bulmer-Thomas’s relative levels of GDP per capita estimates differ widely from our 
data for some nations, which is not at odds with the most recent estimates (Maddison 
and Oxlad), so there is a difference of minor importance.  This is the case for Chile, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.  For the first two of these countries our data provides a clearly 
less favourable picture than that offered by Bulmer-Thomas ?  always with reference to 
1928 ?  while the case of the last country is the reverse.  In the same way the most 
spectacular discordance r efers to Cuba; which, for Bulmer-Thomas has a level of 
material welfare barely superior to the Latin American average, whilst according to our 
figures it is at the top.
68 Scrutinising the two last GDP per capita estimates one can see 
that for most of the economies very similar figures are given.  It is interesting to note 
that when this is not the case, generally, our estimate of relative volume of imported 
capital goods provides greater verisimilitude to one of the two GDP calculations.  This 
is the case for Costa Rica  ?  where the Oxlad estimate appears to be manifestly 
exaggerated  ?  and for Chile  ?  where the figure proposed by Maddison would be 
excessive ?  and for Venezuela ?  for which the Oxlad evaluation seems to fall short.  In 
the case of Nicaragua it w ould be risky to venture which is the most reasonable GDP 
per capita figure, given that both far exceed the relative level produced by the capital 
goods imports.  And it has to be added that this would be a strange pattern for the small   29
Central American economies (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua).  Evaluated by their 
capital goods imports, these economies would be much poorer than the level adjudged 
by the experts according to estimates of their production.  Here lies the most visible 
difference between our estimates and those of these authors.  Curiously, there is no such 
difference in respect to El Salvador.
69  Mexico’s case is interesting as our estimate is, 
just like the other Central American economies, much lower, but could be corrected if 
we complete capital goods import data with domestic iron and steel production, as 
mentioned earlier. The discrepancies with Bulmer-Thomas, Maddison and Oxlad are 
reduced to almost half their level. On the other hand, one cannot ignore Argentina, 
where the discrepancy is also significant.  For the remaining countries  there is either 
not too great a difference (Brazil, Colombia), or there is even a basic equivalence 
(Chile, El Salvador, Venezuela). 
 
It is certainly much more difficult to reconcile our estimate of machinery imports with 
Hofman’s estimate of investment in machinery and equipment.  In fact the resulting 
figures from both estimates are not reconcilable, which presents a veritable enigma 
when one considers that essentially these are magnitudes more comparable than the 
previous ones.
70 The relative level of Argentinean capital goods imports doubles that of 
investment, whilst the reverse is the case in Brazil.  For Mexico and Colombia the 
differences are less extreme, but are still large.  Only in the case of Venezuela are the 
positions not very separate, whilst for Chile calculations produce virtually the same 
results. 
 
Our discrepancies with Hofman’s estimates underline a fundamental difference in 
methodological approach. We have been using current values and current exchange   30
rates, while Hofman, but also Maddison, Oxlad and Bulmer-Thomas rely extensively on 
constant price estimates based on distant benchmarks (1980, 1990, 1980 and 1970, 
respectively).  In some cases the raw data is built from other price benchmarks, further 
complicating the comparisons.  We are prevented to reach any conclusion from all these 
price transformations.  It is quite understandable that the differences are largest with 
Hofman as we both are assessing investment.  As we well know, the price of capital 
goods in Latin America was increasingly distant from the price in the world markets.  
Intertemporal comparisons of capital goods values becomes much more difficult once 
import substitution starts.  Our contribution is, partly, to restore a cross section approach 
at current prices before import substitution made these comparisons so difficult. 
 
To sum up, the cross-referencing of the data presented in this paper with that offered by 
the economic historians who have calculated the basic macromagnitudes of the Latin 
American nations provides a reading which opens up a promising research agenda.  The 
empirical evidence which we have extracted from imports of capital goods has allowed 
the delineation of approximate levels of investment in all the Latin American countries, 
without exception, in the middle of the 1920s.  The position of each country is realistic 
in the light of the knowledge accumulated by historiography.  But it does not always 
tally with the quantifications of GDP and capital formation undertaken so far.  In our 
opinion this accumulated knowledge is sufficiently similar to our results for them not to 
be rejected.  Our results also challenge this knowledge to the point where it is necessary 
to extend the quantitative estimate over a wider period in order to categorically test the 
consistency of capital goods imports as an indicator of investment.  Meanwhile, we 
have reinforced the idea of the Cuban economy being very prosperous in 1925.  We 
have also reaffirmed the accepted perceptions of Argentina and Uruguay.  We have   31
presented evidence that Chile must have been quite similar to Uruguay.  If our estimate 
is to be credited, Venezuela was already enjoying a first wave of prosperity.  At the end 
of the order comes Haiti as the poorest economy in the region, followed, at quite a 
distance, by Ecuador.  The land-locked states, Bolivia and Paraguay, are slightly less 
underdeveloped, whilst the Central American economies appear appreciably below the 
average  ?   with the exception of Costa Rica.  Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru make up the central nucleus, clearly below the Latin American 
average in per capita terms, but in the middle of the ranking. 
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Table 1.   Relative importance of the more industrialized countries on imports of iron and steel goods (total) in Latin 
America for the years 1913 and 1925 (by per cent) 
  US         UK  Germany  G3  France  Belgium
a  G5 
  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925  1913  1925 
Argentina  19.3  39.1  37.3  25.0  24.5  17.0  81.1  81.2  6.4  4.6  8.4  8.8  95.9  94.6 
Bolivia     37.2     13.6     13.2     64.0     1.9     16.2     82.1 
Brazil  21.4  37.0  26.0  19.5  23.5  24.1  70.9  80.6  11.8  3.5  11.4  5.4  94.1  89.4 
Colombia     70.6     9.7     11.7     91.9     0.1     4.1     96.1 
Costa Rica  68.2  72.8  12.5  8.5  10.3  13.0  91.0  94.3  1.0  0.2  0.3  0.6  92.3  95.1 
Cuba  73.6  88.0  10.1  1.5  6.4  2.3  90.0  91.9  2.7  0.3  6.4  1.1  99.1  93.3 
Chile  21.5  49.8  31.4  19.0  34.5  15.9  87.4  84.7  2.5  1.9  8.3  8.9  98.1  95.4 
Ecuador     49.0     19.8     18.8     87.5     0.3     5.4     93.3 
El Salvador  63.6  80.3  17.0  6.8  15.6  9.3  96.2  96.3  1.1  1.8  1.6  0.8  98.9  98.9 
Guatemala     75.5     10.0     11.4     96.9     0.6     0.7     98.3 
Haiti     57.7     11.7     12.2     81.6     10.8     0.0     92.4 
Mexico  69.5  84.6  14.4  4.7  10.6  7.9  94.4  97.2  3.0  0.1  1.2  0.1  98.6  97.3 
Nicaragua     83.0     7.1     7.3     97.4     0.0     0.0     97.4 
Peru  50.4  55.4  20.9  20.4  15.9  11.7  87.2  87.5  2.6  0.8  8.6  3.4  98.4  91.7 
Dominican Rep.     88.3     3.0     4.3     95.6     0.0     0.4     96.0 
                                           
Total 8 countries  31.5  52.1  27.8  17.4  20.9  15.5  80.2  85.0  7.3  2.8  8.4  5.6  95.9  93.5 
Total 15 countries   53.5     16.7     15.1     85.4     2.7     5.5     93.5 
Notes:  
We lack data for Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 




Germany: Der Auswärtige Handel Deutschlands, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing. 
Argentina: Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario del comercio exterior de la República Argentina, Buenos Aires, Imp. Mercatali. 
Belgium: Ministère des Finances, Tableau annuel du commerce avec les pays étrangers, Bruxelles, Ministère des Finances. 
Bolivia: Dirección General de Aduanas, Comercio especial de Bolivia. Exportación-Importación, La Paz, ed. Don Bosco. 
Brazil: Directoria de Estatistica Commercial, Commercio exterior do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Ministerio da Fazenda. 
Colombia: Departamento de Contraloría, Anuario Estadístico. Comercio Exterior, Bogotá, Impr. Nacional. 
Costa Rica: Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico, San José, Imp. Lines A. Reyes. 
Cuba: Secretaría de Hacienda, Comercio Exterior, La Habana, Impr. Carasa y cía. 
Chile: Oficina Central de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de la República de Chile: Comercio Exterior, Valparaíso, Impr. y Litografía Universo. 
Ecuador: Dirección General de Estadística, Comercio Exterior del Ecuador en los años..., Quito, Talleres Tipográficos Nacionales. 
US: Department of Commerce, The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, Washington, Government Printing Office. 
El Salvador: Dirección General de Estadística, Estadística comercial, San Salvador, Dirección General de Estadística. 
France: Direction Générale des Douanes, Tableau générale du commerce et de la navigation, Paris, Impr. Nationale. 
Guatemala: Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Memoria de las labores del Ejecutivo en el ramo de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Guatemala, Tipografía 
Nacional. 
Haiti: Financial Adviser-General Receiver, Annual report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the fiscal year..., Washington, Government Printing 
Office. 
Mexico: Departamento de Estadística Nacional, Anuario Estadístico: Comercio exterior y navegación, México, Departamento de Estadística Nacional. 
Nicaragua: Administración de Aduanas, Memoria del Recaudador General de Aduanas y las Estadísticas del Comercio de..., Managua, Oficina del recaudador 
general de aduanas. 
Paraguay: Dirección General de Estadística, El comercio exterior del Paraguay, Asunción, Impr. Nacional. 
Peru: Superintendencia General de Aduanas, Estadística especial del Perú, Callao, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio. 
Britain: Statistical Office of the Customs and Excise Department, Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and Britain 
possessions, London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
Dominican Republic : Receptoría General de Aduanas, Report of the...fiscal period. Together with summary of commerce, Washington, Government Printing 
Office. 
Uruguay: Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Montevideo, Dirección General de Estadística. 
Venezuela: Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Estadística mercantil y marítima , Caracas, Imp. Bolívar. 
 




Table 2.   Relative importance of exported machinery from the large industrialized 
countries on machinery imports in Latin America in 1925 (in per cent) 
   US  UK  Germany  G3  France  Belgium  G5 
                       
Argentina  49.2  10.8  23.8  83.8  4.0  2.5  90.3 
Bolivia  53.0  11.9  12.8  77.7  3.1  7.2  88.1 
Brazil  25.0  28.6  28.5  82.0  3.5  0.9  86.4 
Colombia  78.8  8.7  7.6  95.1  0.1  1.8  97.0 
Costa Rica  71.9  13.5  8.9  94.4  0.0  0.0  94.4 
Cuba  89.6  1.2  3.2  94.0  0.0  0.0  94.0 
Chile  53.7  19.5  16.8  90.0  1.9  3.9  95.9 
Ecuador  52.6  22.6  16.9  92.1  0.3  1.1  93.5 
El Salvador  62.1  22.6  10.6  95.3  2.2  0.9  98.4 
Guatemala  66.5  15.3  16.4  98.1  0.3  0.0  98.4 
Haiti  78.0  11.6  5.2  94.8  0.3  0.0  95.2 
Mexico  81.2  5.9  9.1  96.3  0.0  0.0  96.3 
Nicaragua  84.6  6.9  5.8  97.3  0.0  0.0  97.3 
Peru  56.0  23.7  10.4  90.1  0.9  1.4  92.4 
Dominican Rep.  88.7  2.8  5.7  97.2  0.0  0.0  97.2 
                       
Total 15 countries
  57.4  14.2  16.9  88.5  2.0  1.4  91.9 
Sources: 




















Table 3.   Comparison of values of all iron and steel products with electrical material exported by G3 and imported by Latin America in 1925, according to 
respective foreign trade figures (in dollars and in percentage) 
US  UK  Germany  G3 
Export.*  Import.* 
Difference  
(2) and 
(1), in %  Export.*  Import.* 
Difference  
(5) and (4), 
in %  Export.*  Import.* 
Difference 
(8) and (7), 
in % 
Export.*  Import.* 
Difference 
(11) and 
(10), in %   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Argentina    76,575,688 69,534,885 -9.2 43,227,204 46,463,921  7.5 30,780,302 32,959,345 7.1 150,583,194 148,958,151 -1.1
Bolivia  1,638,941 2,246,897 37.1 304,541 820,297  169.4 917,014 814,842 -11.1 2,860,496 3,882,036 35.7
Brazil      40,923,660 45,523,591 11.2 20,392,259 23,124,662  13.4 27,083,686 28,658,768 5.8 88,399,605 97,307,021 10.1
Colombia  17,255,579 17,065,158 -1.1 2,318,644 2,396,057  3.3 2,896,936 2,894,269 -0.1 22,471,159 22,355,484 -0.5
Costa Rica  1,537,103 1,733,323 12.8 292,295 187,659  -35.8 252,756 320,883 27.0 2,082,154 2,241,865 7.7
Cuba      49,708,508 49,293,892 -0.8 1,123,815 861,774  -23.3 1,752,156 1,394,954 -20.4 52,584,479 51,550,620 -2.0
Chile    17,563,263 18,095,546 3.0 7,317,273 6,916,147  -5.5 6,518,582 6,133,250 -5.9 31,399,118 31,144,943 -0.8
Ecuador   1,260,448 1,353,083 7.3 524,695 631,635  20.4 624,512 677,114 8.4 2,409,655 2,661,831 10.5
El Salvador  3,191,587 4,500,967 41.0 345,225 367,448  6.4 208,964 512,268 145.1 3,745,776 5,380,682 43.6
Guatemala  3,349,436 2,727,791 -18.6 436,039 447,941  2.7 689,486 550,034 -20.2 4,474,961 3,725,766 -16.7
Haiti      1,247,494 1,224,389 -1.9 248,534 202,186  -18.6 235,620 190,391 -19.2 1,731,648 1,616,966 -6.6
Honduras   1,579,699    1,134,945     84,728     2,799,372    
Mexico   52,387,752 46,707,325 -10.8 2,563,243 2,551,799  -0.4 5,146,750 4,542,604 -11.7 60,097,745 53,801,728 -10.5
Nicaragua  1,595,968 1,545,181 -3.2 120,493 131,442  9.1 114,240 136,610 19.6 1,830,701 1,813,233 -1.0
Panama   4,302,684   142,653     127,092    4,572,429   
Paraguay  224,598   57,200     193,018    474,816   
Peru   10,257,997 11,232,545 9.5 3,411,442 4,216,301  23.6 2,513,756 2,429,879 -3.3 16,183,195 17,878,725 10.5
Dominican Rep.   4,390,387 4,494,232 2.4 102,109 151,314  48.2 243,236 221,184 -9.1 4,735,732 4,866,730 2.8
Uruguay  6,589,064   3,576,126     3,189,438    13,354,628   
Venezuela  13,533,047   1,872,546     1,429,666    16,835,259   
                                 
Latin America  (15)**  282,883,811 277,278,804 -2.0 82,727,811 89,470,581  8.2 79,977,996 82,436,395 3.1 445,589,618 449,185,779 0.8
Notes: 
* The exports refer to foreign trade figures for the G3 countries, while the imports correspond to the figures for the Latin American nations. 
** The totals correspond to the 15 countries with full information. 
Sources:  
See table 1. 
 Table 4.   Total imports for metal and electrical products in 1925, estimated from G3 
exports (in dollars) 
         $ per 100h. 
   Imports  Population  $ per 100h.  LA-20 = 100 
Argentina  185,447,283  10,500,000     1,766.2  289.4 
Bolivia 
a  5,054,586  2,260,000     223.7  36.6 
Brazil  109,676,929  30,330,000     361.6  59.3 
Colombia  24,451,751  6,720,000     363.9  59.6 
Costa Rica  2,208,010  460,000     480.0  78.7 
Cuba  57,219,237  3,432,000     1,667.2  273.2 
Chile  32,913,121  4,070,000     808.7  132.5 
Ecuador  2,753,891  1,720,000     160.1  26.2 
El Salvador  3,889,695  1,300,000     299.2  49.0 
Guatemala  4,618,123  1,510,000     305.8  50.1 
Haiti  2,122,118  2,260,000     93.9  15.4 
Honduras 
b  2,909,043  850,000     342.2  56.1 
Mexico  61,828,956  15,200,000     406.8  66.7 
Nicaragua  1,882,573  660,000     285.2  46.7 
Panama 
c  3,188,634  460,000     693.2  113.6 
Paraguay 
d  2,048,670  790,000     259.3  42.5 
Peru  18,495,080  5,230,000     353.6  57.9 
Dominican Rep.  4,953,695  1,050,000     471.8  77.3 
Uruguay 
e  16,507,574  1,570,000     1.051.4  172.3 
Venezuela 
f  19,713,418  2,950,000     668.3  109.5 
           
Latin America (20)  561,882,388  92,072,000     610.3  100 
Sources: 
Imports: see table 1 and text; Population: http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk 
Notes: 
a A correction  factor of 1.131 has been applied, resulting from a division of the fob value of total imports 
of metal products (3,235,030 $ which converts to the total of registered imports 3,882,036 after adding 
20%) and the aggregates of the G3 exports of aforementioned goods (2.860.496 $), according to our 
calculations. 
b The average of the four Central American countries of which we know (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua) has been applied as an extrapolation factor; 0.962.  
c We have taken the figure for iron and steel imports calculated by the  Société des Nations, 
Mémorandum sur le commerce international…1912-1926, III, p. 214, headings ‘Iron and steel 
manufactures’, ‘Electrical Machines and apparatus’, ‘Machinery, other’ and ‘Vehicles’,  to which has been 
added the electrical material exports of G3 (752.634 $, according to our calculations). 
d Value taken from ibid, p. 214. Referring to the headings ‘Structural Iron, etc.’, ‘Machinery’, ‘Other iron 
manufactures’ and ‘Vehicles’. 
e The average of Argentina and Brazil (1.236) is applied as an extrapolation factor. 
f The average of the region (1.171) is applied as an extrapolation factor. 




Table 5.   Total machinery imports of the Latin American countries in 1925. 
Estimation based on G3 exports (in dollars) 
       $ per 100h 
   Imports  $ per 100h  LA-20=100 
Argentina  41,300,150  393.3  238.1 
Bolivia 
a  1,641,626  72.6  44.0 
Brazil  33,813,840  111.5  67.5 
Colombia  5,819,070  86.6  52.4 
Costa Rica  532,017  115.7  70.0 
Cuba  16,931,146  493.3  298.6 
Chile  11,628,319  285.7  173.0 
Ecuador  752,341  43.7  26.5 
El Salvador  857,299  65.9  39.9 
Guatemala  1,047,371  69.4  42.0 
Haiti  358,416  15.9  9.6 
Honduras 
b  446,705  52.6  31.8 
Mexico  19,792,783  130.2  78.8 
Nicaragua  583,837  88.5  53.6 
Panama 
c  536,000  116.5  70.5 
Paraguay 
d  569,244  72.1  43.6 
Peru  6,256,249  119.6  72.4 
Dominican Rep.  1,213,530  115.6  70.0 
Uruguay 
e  3,639,892  231.8  140.3 
Venezuela 
f  6,436,680  218.2  132.1 
          
 Latin America(20)  154,156,515  165.2  100 
Sources: 
See table 4. 
Notes: 
a See note from table 4.  
b The average of the four Central American countries of which we know (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) has been applied as an extrapolation factor; 0.963. 
c The figure for machinery imports (machinery and electrical equipment and other machinery) 
calculated by the Société des Nations, Mémorandum sur le commerce international…1912-
1926, III, p. 214 (see note C of table 4) is used. 
d Value corresponding to the year 1926, taken by the League of Nations, op. cit. refers to the 
heading "Machinery". 
e The average of Argentina and Brazil (1.2063) is applied as an extrapolation factor. 
f The average of the region (1.13) is applied as an extrapolation factor 
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Table 6.  Relative levels of machinery imports per capita ( Latin America = 100 ) 
   1924  1925  average 
Argentina  251.0  238.1  244.6 
Bolivia  52.1  44.0  48.0 
Brazil  58.3  67.5  62.9 
Colombia  46.1  52.4  49.3 
Costa Rica  75.0  70.0  72.5 
Cuba  356.2  298.6  327.4 
Chile  168.5  173.0  170.7 
Ecuador  39.5  26.5  33.0 
El Salvador  51.9  39.9  45.9 
Guatemala  45.9  42.0  44.0 
Haiti  7.0  9.6  8.3 
Honduras  45.6  31.8  38.7 
Mexico  78.7  78.8  78.8 
Nicaragua  49.8  53.6  51.7 
Panama  93.8  70.5  82.2 
Paraguay  41.8  43.6  42.7 
Peru  75.3  72.4  73.9 
Dominican Rep.  122.7  70.0  96.3 
Uruguay  116.1  140.3  128.2 
Venezuela  95.4  132.1  113.7 
         
 Latin America (20)  100  100  100 
Sources:  
same as table 1. 
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Table 7.   Relative levels of capital goods imports in 1925 estimated   
( Latin America = 100 ) 
  









Argentina  238.1  338.2  291.5  290.6  291.7 
Bolivia  44.0  30.8  38.1  37.5  33.5 
Brazil  67.5  45.7  71.7  60.0  54.5 
Colombia  52.4  76.6  45.3  61.7  31.5 
Costa Rica  70.0  88.5  67.7  78.8  84.3 
Cuba  298.6  264.0  248.2  270.5  379.2 
Chile  173.0  152.2  116.6  147.8  181.7 
Ecuador  26.5  31.8  14.8  26.6  26.9 
El Salvador  39.9  48.8  58.7  49.8  41.6 
Guatemala  42.0  45.7  63.8  50.6  50.2 
Haiti  9.6  20.2  13.5  16.0  7.4 
Honduras  31.8  44.8  99.5  57.5  39.8 
México  78.8  55.8  69.0  66.9  72.1 
Nicaragua  53.6  52.6  29.1  47.3  43.4 
Panama  70.5  130.2  50.1  92.8  -- 
Paraguay  43.6  46.0  42.3  45.1  -- 
Peru  72.4  55.9  48.9  59.0  50.9 
Dominican Rep.  70.0  71.0  101.5  80.2  45.0 
Uruguay  140.3  182.9  188.1  172.8  180.7 
Venezuela  132.1  115.4  86.0  113.4  60.1 
                 
 Latin America(20 
countries)  100  100  100  100  100
a 
Note: 
a average of 18 countries (not including Panama or Paraguay) 
 
  
Table 8.   Levels of some macromagnitudes in 1925, in values per inhabitant, and in relation to the average of the countries 
indicated 
 
   LA-14 = 100  LA-13 = 100  LA-11 = 100  LA-6 = 100 
  
GDP, in 1928  Capital 
goods  GDP  Capital 
















(2003)  OXLAD 
Tafunell & 
Carreras  Hofman 
Tafunell & 
Carreras 
Argentina  216.3  276.4  221.4  304.1  219.9  222.3  292.9  129.4  237.7 
Bolivia                       
Brazil  60.6  56.6  56.9  61.4  56.5  56.0  60.0  113.6  66.4 
Colombia  59.8  56.9  70.9  58.8  70.4  75.7  60.3  65.4  49.1 
Costa Rica  83.0  75.1  94.0  81.5  93.4  193.1  79.6       
Cuba  112.9  260.9                  
Chile  189.8  126.6  162.4  136.8  161.4  136.0  134.1  168.9  169.6 
Ecuador                       
El Salvador  45.8  46.8  52.2  50.8  51.9  54.3  49.6       
Guatemala  73.9  47.9  82.5  46.6  81.9  83.2  50.7       
Haiti                       
Honduras  84.5  53.6  75.1  58.1  74.6  75.6  56.8       
Mexico
a  95.5  63.7  107.8  66.2  107.1  113.9  67.5  50.5  74.4 
Nicaragua  71.6  44.6  82.4  48.4  81.9  65.3  47.2       
Panama                       
Paraguay                       
Peru  61.7  55.3  65.3  62.9              
Dominican Rep.                       
Uruguay  224.2  164.5  180.1  182.8              
Venezuela  74.6  104.6  117.5  107.5  116.8  80.5  110.8  109.9  123.2 
                        
 Latin America   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Sources: Bulmer-Thomas, The economic history of Latin America…; Maddison, The world economy…; OXLAD, http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk; 
Hofman, The economic development of Latin America.  Tafunell & Carreras, see text. 
Notes: 
(a) An alternative estimate of ours will increase Mexico’s indices by a 20 per cent to take into account iron and steel domestic production. See text. 
  
 





















































































































































































































































































































































Graph 2.  Machinery and capital goods per capita imports in 1925 (Latin 
America=100)
Machinery Capital goods  28
 
                                                 
NOTES: 
 
1 This article is part of the research project Importaciones y modernización económica en América Latina, 
1890-1960, funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (BEC2003-0190).  We are grateful 
to our research team colleagues César Yáñez, Mar Rubio and Mauricio Folchi.  We acknowledge Frank 
Notten’s careful research assistance and the detailed comments received from André Hofman, Sandra 
Kuntz, Colin Lewis, Graciela Márquez and Paolo Riguzzi in occasion of presentations at the Asociación 
Argentina de Historia Económica, at the  Asociación Mexicana de Historia Económica and at the 
Economic History Society conferences. 
2 See the cases of individual nations analysed in Cárdenas, E, Ocampo, J.A., and Thorp, R., eds., An 
Economic History…, 1.4 
3 Maddison, A., The World Economy.... For the previous period there does not exist, for now, a better 
study for the year 1913 than Bulmer-Thomas, V., The Economic History of Latin America.... 
4 United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, New York, 1951.  
5 Series of studies carried out between 1951 and 1961, entitled Análisis y Proyecciones del desarrollo 
económico. El desarrollo económico de.... 
6 The countries studied were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panamá and Perú. See Naciones Unidas. CEPAL, Cepalindex. Documentos…. C. Yáñez and 
X. Tafunell have catalogued the statistical material on imports and national accounts compiled by ECLA, 
although never published, they show that the methodology of the works of ‘Analysis and projections’ 
were applied in every country. In the ECLA headquarters exist, in addition,  mimeografed documents 
similar to the publications  ‘Analysis a nd projections’ for Cuba, Chile, México and Nicaragua.  See, 
Yáñez, C. and Tafunell, X.,  Informe sobre la recuperación del patrimonio documental estadístico 
histórico de la CEPAL. Las series de larga duración sobre las principales variables macroeconómicas de 
América Latina y el Caribe, September 2003, available at:  
http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/4/15284/P15284.xml&xsl=/deype/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/deype/tpl/top-bottom.xslt  
7 Hofman, A. A. The Economic Development of Latin America…. 
8 Fishlow, A., ‘Origins and Consequences of Import Substitution...’; Villela, A. & Suzigan, W., 
‘Government policy’;  Suzigan, W., Industria brasileira…   29
                                                                                                                                               
9 Haber, S., ‘It wasn’t all Prebisch’s fault…’. 
10 For more details, see: Carreras, A., Yañez, C., Hofman, A., Tafunell, X.,  Folchi, M. and Rubio, M., 
‘Importaciones y modernización económica en América Latina durante la primera mitad del siglo XX. 
Las claves de un programa de investigación’, in Actas del  Segundo Congreso Nacional de Historia 
Económica, Asociación Mexicana de Historia Económica, Mexico D.F., October 2004 (on CD). 
11 Clear examples of this confusion can be found in instruments, utensils, tools and other metal artefacts, 
or in articles of hardware . 
12 Data on the commerce of these types of products has also been collected but we can not yet offer 
results.  It has to be pointed out that electrical material includes cable, which means that a substantial 
portion of finished copper is included in this category.  Iron and steel finished goods also include articles 
made of tin and other alloys. 
13 Calculated from the combined imports of the Latin American countries, except Honduras, Panama and 
Paraguay.  Costa Rica, with 13%, is the only economy in which incoming finished goods made of 
nonferrous metal amount for more than 10% of imports of iron and steel articles . 
14 For total imports for the years 1913, 1929, 1938 and 1950, see Pan American Union,  The Foreign 
Trade of Latin America…. 
15 We have not been able to locate statistics for Honduras and Panama for the year 1925.  Those for 
Paraguay are so patchy as to be practically unusable.  Statistics for Uruguay do not provide information 
for country of origin by product, whilst those for Venezuela are presented in a block by customs, which 
results in extremely labourious work for determining the figures of the total of the articles under study 
imported f rom each country.  As for the year 1913, the gaps in statistics for foreign trade are more 
numerous due to being more difficult to locate, and even, in the case of some small nations, to the fact 
that they were not published.   
16 In fact, everything points to both countries being as dependent on imports from the most advanced 
economies as the rest of the region.  What happened was that since there was no direct trade between 
these economies and Bolivia and Paraguay, a part of the traded products was assigned to intermediary 
states, especially Chile for the former and Argentina for the latter. 
17 One must not overlook the exceptional character of both countries from the geographical point of view 
in the American continent. Access from the exterior for mechandise was extremely costly, especially in 
the case of Bolivia, due to its orografic conditions.   30
                                                                                                                                               
18 See Federico, G. and  Tena, A. ‘On the accuracy of foreign trade…’, and the cited bibliography. 
19 One of these countries is the US -- the largest supplier -- which has halted us for the moment in the 
process of comparing quantities.  Not only do the North American statistics employ different units of 
capacity and volume, but on occasions they simply note the number of units exported (as in the case of 
cars and other means of transport).  Here we have refused to estimate the average weight of such units 
since this would introduce margins of error that could be confused with disparities between the figures 
from the exporting country and the importing country. 
20 The restriction comes from the British statistics which, as will be explained, only offer data for exports 
to all the Latin American countries in the categories ‘iron and steel and manufactures thereof’ and 
‘machinery’.  Fixed material for transport (rails, ties, sleepers etc) falls under the first heading.  
‘Machinery’ includes equipment for the generation, transmission and transformation of electricity (as well 
as a part of electrical material, impossible to exactly define, and electric motors for trains and trams).  On 
the other hand the commercial statistics for Germany and the US provide very detailed and systematic 
information for all the countries.  Because of this we have adopted the classification forced on us by the 
British statistics.  The only problem to report is that some of the North American headings for agricultural 
machinery also include hand tools and utensils. 
21 15 of the 20 Latin American countries registered  the country of consignment as country of origin of the 
products they imported. See Société des Nations, Mémorandum sur le comerce.... 
22 As mentioned in note 20.  Apparently the British statistics only show what was exported under all 
headings for Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
23 Specifically, exports with a total value of less than 5000 marks under any of the statistical headings.  
Given this structure and bearing in mind what exports below this level represented in the U. S. statistics, 
we would hazard a guess and say that the under-evaluation of the German figures is of hardly any 
relevance. 
24 One would have to resort to an overall view if it were discovered, or there were a founded suspicion, 
that a large movement in trade was not registered in the statistics.  Because of this, national differences 
would be evened out due to a confusion between country of consignment and country of destination or 
origin.  But before resorting to the hypothesis of a regional redistribution of articles imported from the 
centre one has to discount the possibility that the discrepancies between the figures given by exporters   31
                                                                                                                                               
and importers simply originate from different accounting methods -- or incomplete accounting -- of 
commercial exchanges. 
25 According to the previously cited study by the League of Nations, the merchandise imported to the 
entrepôts tended to represent very low percentages, around 1%, in Latin American countries.  This could 
explain the discrepancies observed in the three first countries mentioned.  In the case of the Dominican 
Republic the difference, on the other hand, is probably due to the  statistics not distinguishing between 
products from the US or Puerto Rico. 
26 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Commerce Yearbook 1926, II, p. 211. 
27 The official Argentinean organisation in charge of compiling trade figures developed an alternative 
evaluation system, limited to a reduced number of products with the aim of obtaining "true" import 
figures.  The same thing occurred in Uruguay. 
28 As has been mentioned, Colombian imports are expressed as c.i.f. values, as are those from Haiti.  On 
the other hand, Mexican imports are expressed as f.o.b. values, whilst Peruvian imports add 20% to f.o.b. 
values.  In the case of the Central American country, according to the experts, the statistics of this time 
are faulty.  See  Kuntz, S., ‘El comercio México-Estados Unidos...’, and, by the same author, ‘Nuevas 
series del comercio exterior...’. We can conject that they did not register all entries of stock in the other 
three countries.  An alternative explanation, especially in the case of  Haiti, would be that in their trade 
statistics some of the products under study are not assignable to identified headings, but put together in a 
generic category (other articles). 
29 The statistics included in the report presented to Parliament by the Ministry of taxation, do not offer the 
importation values of each type of product; they only show the value (and quantity) of the products 
imported from each country.  Thus, it is not possible to verify whether the sum of imports from different 
countries of origin corresponds with total i mports.  But the difference can not be attributed to an 
individual mistake, given that there are imbalances in almost all the headings and in respect to the three 
countries of the centre. 
30 See above. 
31 The most recent rigorous study of Cuban industry and economy between the wars completely ignores 
the very high position of the island in the ranking of the Latin American economies, despite one of the 
great merits of this work being a new estimate of the Cuban GDP far above the levels of previous 
estimates. See Antonio Santamaría, Sin azúcar no hay país....   32
                                                                                                                                               
32 See Bulmer-Thomas, V., The Economic History of Latin America...., and Thorp, R., Progreso, pobreza 
y exclusion…, pp. 90-2. 
33 To be exact,  27,4%. According to our calculations, the percentage was practically the same as in 1913.  
34 Hofman, A., The Economic Development of Latin America, p.188. 
35 Taylor, A., ‘Capital accumulation’, p.180. 
36 We make reference to the reports compiled by the United States Tariff Commission entitled Mining 
and manufacturing industries in..., published in 1945.  The references cited below correspond to the 
monograph on the country mentioned. 
37 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Bolivia..., p. 13. 
38 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Costa Rica..., pp. 6-7. 
39 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Ecuador..., p. 9. 
40 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in El Salvador..., pp. 5 y 7. 
41 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Guatemala..., pp. 5 y 8. 
42 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Haiti..., p. 8. 
43 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Honduras..., p. 6. 
44 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Nicaragua..., p. 8. 
45 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Panama..., p. 9. 
46 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Paraguay..., p. 6. 
47 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries  in the Dominican Republic..., p. 
8. 
48 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries  in Venezuela..., p. 40. 
49 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Colombia..., pp. 40-1. 
50 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries in Peru..., pp. 8 y 10. 
51 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries  in Cuba..., pp. 3-5 y 9. 
52 United States Tariff Comission, Mining and manufacturing industries  in Uruguay..., pp. 7-11, 23-32. 
53 See Naciones Unidas, Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico. III: El desarrollo económico 
de Colombia, p. 10, and Naciones Unidas, Análisis y proyeccciones del desarrollo económico. VI: El 
desarrollo industrial del Perú, p. 141. 
54 See Fishlow, ‘Origins and consequences of import substitution…’.   33
                                                                                                                                               
55 Díaz Alejandro, C.F., Ensayos sobre la historia económica argentina, p. 209. It is interesting to note 
the almost total inexistence of industry capable of producing electrical equipment and material, despite 
Argentina being the Latin American nation with the most extensive electrification.  See Boix, E., Los 
artículos para la electricidad... 1921, and, especially the series of national studies on ‘electrical goods’ 
compiled by the US Department of Commerce, in particular, Electrical goods in Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Brazil…; Electrical goods in Cuba…; and Electrical goods in Bolivia and Chile…. 
56 Naciones Unidas, Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico. II: El desarrollo económico de 
Brasil, p. 71. 
57 Naciones Unidas, Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico. V: el desarrollo económico de la 
Argentina, I, p. 164.  
58 Argentina, with 9,857 m etric tons, Brazil (3,946) and Chile (2,458) were the countries which imported 
the most.  The acquisitions of the rest were clearly below 1000 metric tons.  Only Panama stands out, 
albeit modestly, with 474 metric tons, due to its obvious role as an intermediary.  In percentage terms, the 
greatest importance of purchase of foundry products in respect to finished goods was in Panama (0.99 %), 
Chile (0.43 ), Argentina (0.32 ), Brasil (0.27 ) y Colombia (0.24 ).  
59 Naciones Unidas. Comisión Económica para América Latina,  Estudio de la industria siderúrgica..., 
pp.94-6.   
60 Ibid., p.96.  
61 Our own estimate, from México,  Anuario Estadístico…  This is a lower bound since foreign trade 
statistics in Mexico did not count the weight of vehicles and other means of transport. 
62 The collection of studies cited is littered with references to this interaction, which is the subject of 
detailed examination, generally of a prospective nature.  In fact the ECLA gives great importance to this 
question by judging it as a potentially serious threat to the industrial development of the economies in the 
area.  The pressure it introduced on the balance of payments converted the growing necessity of importing 
capital goods into a suffocating external restriction on growth. 
63 As well as the primary sources previously cited, see A. Santamaría, Sin azúcar no hay país…, and 
Thorp, R. & Bertram, G., Peru 1890-1977. Growth and policy in an open economy…, ch. 6 and app. 4. 
64 Madisson, A., The world economy…  Oxlad, http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk 
65 Bulmer-Thomas, V., The economic history of Latin America…, app.3.   34
                                                                                                                                               
66The series on formation and capital stock  calculated by Hofman, The Economic Development of Latin 
America ...  
67 All the magnitudes refer to their per capita value and are expressed from here on as an index number in 
respect to the per capita value of the group as a whole.  Investment in machinery (and equipment) per 
capita has been calculated using the data for the international GDP per capita in dollars in 1980 and the 
percentage of investment in this type of goods in respect to GDP (tables B.4 and D.6, in the appendices).  
68 The Maddison estimate placed Cuba in 1929 (starting point of the series) at an even lower ranking, 
under the regional average.  
69We must remember, in passing, that there is a shadow of doubt cast over the El-Salvadorian figures for 
capital goods imports, deduced, as for almost all the countries, from the G3 statistics, due to the fact that 
they were much lower than those registered by the El-Salvadorian statistics.  The table now commented 
on reaffirms a posteriori the validity of the figures we have estimated for this country.  
70 The picture would barely be altered if the Maddison and Oxlad  data were restricted to the six nations 
studied by Hofman and expressed in relation to the average of these six countries. 
 
 